Silliman's Papers

A Matter of Function
By Daniel Silliman
Contemporary Issues in Philosophy
for Dr. James Stephens

1. I have a philosophy professor who is colorblind. He mentions this every so often, especially as example of immediate awareness and the Myth of the Given. He is color blind – by which he wants to mean that he doesn’t have the immediate and indubitable awareness of the qualia of color – yet, he can regularly and accurately name colors. He claims that he can’t see color, but every measurable indication is that he knows it. My colorblind professor knows blue in some way, since he can appropriately say something is or isn’t blue. But what does his knowing mean if it’s unrelated to seeing? What does his seeing mean if it’s never a matter of function?

2. Some students have, among themselves, said they suspect he isn’t actually colorblind but that it works so well as an example that he claims to be colorblind for the sake of the examples. When pressed, he continues to claim he doesn’t see color and makes the same claim in non-class situations, leading us to believe he actually is colorblind, and leaving us still with quandary: can we divide between an internal knowing and the external function?

3. If we ask my professor, “how do you know that is blue?” he will say either “those things are normally blue” or “there’s something about the shade that makes that color slightly different.” He can never insist that “it’s just blue and I know it’s blue, damn it.” “Blue” is blue, for him, not because it just is but because of the relation of “blue” to everything around it. If he is as accurate at this as the next man, then the question of whether he really sees color is irrelevant. He may or may not see color, but it’s hard to see exactly where that matters if his use rises to the standard set by linguistic peers. While he may be colorblind in the sense of qualia, if his usage is equal to someone who isn’t, the distinction between colorblind and non-colorblind is nonexistent. The only working distinction between the two isn’t immediate and indubitable awareness of the qualia of color, but the linguistic usage. To “know color” may be meaningful to the individual because of the immediateness of qualia, but to the rest of us, to society, to “know color” is only meaningful in the measurable talk of usage, relation and proximity. For it to be something that matters to us, meaning can’t be a matter of inner certainty. For meaning to matter to us it must be a thing of use, function.

4. One knows color if (and only if) one “knows color.” Knowing is a function not of some certainty via immediate awareness, but of language. One knows something, so far as the rest of us are concerned, when one can talk about it. This is the reason classes have tests or papers. Knowing is a matter of function.

5. Wittgenstein explores this with an example known as “the beetle in a box.” In the example everyone in a society has a beetle in a box that no one else can see, and knowing beetles in any way beyond a peek at your own beetle is a case of linguistics. In fact the beetle in the box itself is uninteresting in its privacy. Only a linguistic “beetle,” which isn’t the beetle at all but is a thing with a place in the linguistic economy, is public, can be discussed and actually be something we know. The beetle, whether it exists or not, can only be of interest and of importance when and where it’s a matter of function.

6. Color isn’t known through private experiences immediately aware, but through a place in syntax. This is not a denial of color sensations, but a claim about knowing color and giving the meaning to color. One can only explain color in terms of a place in linguistic economy. A color can only be spoken of intelligently in its differences from other colors. “Blue” means blue because of syntax, because it holds a position next to “red,” “green,” and “yellow.” Meaning arises from use. Where it is in any way something we can speak of, meaning is a matter of function.

7. To return to language through the analogy of a game that Wittgenstein is always using, a game is a tight system and each piece is defined against the rest of the system and in the system. A knight can only be explained in the context of use, to understand the knight is to use a knight, to move him in the context of the game. It’s hard to imagine how else an explanation would run except in the direction of use. To push the example back into the realm of color awareness, it’s hard to see how knowing white from black is concerning in a case where someone still moves their pieces according to the game. If the distinction has nothing to do with their ability to play, it’s hard to see where it matters. Such distinctions are important, but important as a matter of function.

8. This leaves us groundless in the sense of immediate and indubitable grounds – “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.” – but it saves us any ability to appeal. One can’t give meaningful answers to questions about what one indubitably knows, one can only insist. That which cannot be doubted cannot be explained. If one knows immediately and givenly, one can only insist that one knows in answer to any question. There are no public reasons for a thing totally grounded. An idea with grounds is one that cannot be explored, having no (public) reasons. An idea that can be appealed, justified in the third person, cannot be indubitably grounded. We can only talk about public knowing; we can only talk about knowing that is a public function.